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Abstract:
The reciprocity and reputation i  social networks are considered as important factors to develop 
mutual trust in interfirm cooperation. Because of new insights gleaned from. the embeddedness 
approach, many researchers discuss this by giving considerable attention to the special quality of ties 
and the structural properties of social networks that facilitate the building of interorganizational trust. 
In studies of Japanese buyer-supplier relations, strong and multiplex ties in social networks between 
managers that span organizational boundaries often facilitate the development of interorganizational 
trust in goodwill. However, it still remains unclear how social networks actually help the 
development of interorganizational trust in goodwill. In keeping with the embeddedness approach, 
the aim of this paper is to consider how a high level of relational embeddedness in the social networks 
of managers across organizations develops positive recognition of relational trust in goodwill between 
organizations, and how special properties of structural embeddedness al o amplify this trust. To 
examine this phenomenon, I empirically analyze trust and embeddedness in the social networks of 
managers within two supplier associations of Japanese lectronic manufacturers.
                               Keywords: 
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1. Introduction 
Cooperation between organizations i  considered to be the source of competitive advantage. As 
interfirm cooperation (such as alliances) become a major strategy, the question about how they are 
developed arises. Some researchers suggest that firms may enjoy a high level of mutual trust in their 
cooperation when they have successful. and evolutionary relationships (Child and Faulkner, 1998; 
Ring, 1997). Trust is considered to be an important relational condition for the continuity and 
development of cooperation between organizations, asit socially decreases transaction costs through 
the control of opportunism, encourages buyers and suppliers to invest in relation-specific assets and 
facilitates learning between them (Child.& Faulkner, 1998; Lane, 1998; Uzzi, 1996). Child and 
Faulkner (1998: 46) stress that the evolution of interfirm alliances fundamentally necessitates high 
levels of mutual trust. The factors that contribute to the development of interorganizational trust 
have become significant issues -in studies of cooperative strategy and interfirm networks. Many 
researchers argue that social networks of managers across organizations can facilitate the 
development. of trust among organizations (Guralti, 1998; Ring, 1997; Rowley et al., 2000; Uzzi, 
1996). 
       Special kinds of tie quality and structural forms of social networks are considered to assist 
the development of not only interpersonal but also interorganizational trust. The embeddedness 
approach demonstrates that special structural properties of social networks - such as the repetition, 
content and structure of ties - affect organizations' socio-cognition oftrust (Dacin et al., 1999: 326). 
In particular, if social networks can develop reciprocity between directly linked organizations orserve 
to frequently distribute reputation among indirectly linked organizations, organizational studies how 
that they are likely to help trust building between organizations (De Laat, 1997; Ring, 1997). Ring 
(1997) points out that here is a qualitative difference between two types of trust hrough strong social 
ties, or reciprocity, and reputation. On the one hand, strong social ties increase the predictability of 
goodwill by sharing knowledge, values and goodwill through frequent social exchange, so that trust 
based on goodwill about future long-term collaboration can develop. On the other hand, reputation 
enhances predictability of outcome so that trust can only develop through risk-taking, estimating 
one's partner's competence and performance. 
      It is well known that Japanese keiretsu networks, or firm groups of affiliated companies, 
have relatively deep, long-term and mutual commitments o their cooperation. Dore (1988) and 
Sako (1992) named this trust relationship "goodwill trust." Furthermore, Sako (1992, 129) points 
out that the goodwill trust relationship n Japanese long-term buyer-supplier relations i  developed by 
strong and multiplex ties between boundary spanning managers of buyer and supplier firms. Since 
these ties support he high performance of incremental innovation in quality improvement between 
buyer and supplier organizations that has been a typical competitive advantage of Japanese keiretsu 
networks, one can say that these trust relationships between the buyer and supplier organizations 
create this high performance (Dyer, 2000). However, it remains unclear how these strong ties and 
the multiplex linkage structure of social networks facilitate the development of interorganizational 
trust based on goodwill, because manager network structures in Japanese buyer-supplier relations 
(rather than dyads) have rarely been analyzed using social network methods. 
      The embeddedness approach provides new insight about the development of deep mutual 
trust and shared goodwill for future commitments. It can show us how the special quality of ties and 
the structure of interorganizational manager social networks may facilitate mutual expectations of
stable, unlimited and shared commitments. This is exemplified by the relational trust in goodwill that 
is found in Japanese buyer and supplier networks, so called "vertical keiretsu." The aim of this 
paper is to examine how buyer and supplier organizations can foster mutual relational trust in 
goodwill, based on the embeddedness approach, when they develop reciprocal and multiplex ties 
between managers. To do this, I analyzed the social networks of quality control managers from both 
buyer companies and suppliers within their two supplier associations and focused on the effects of 
social cohesion and multiplex connections upon the development of interorganizational trust between 
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buyer and supplier organizations. I advance my argument in the following three steps. First, 
reviewing previous discussions about interorganizational networks and trust from the perspective of 
embeddedness, I argue that high levels' of relational embeddedness develop relational trust in 
goodwill, while special properties of structural embeddedness facilitate trust in ability and 
performance. Second, in order to empirically examine these hypotheses, I evaluate data for two 
networks of supplier associations associated with two Japanese electronic companies in order to 
analyze the contact network structure of quality managers among buyer and suppliers organizations 
and consider how characteristics of embeddedness affect socio-cognition of interorganizational trust. 
I find that strong and cohesive ties affect the cognition of high levels of relational trust in goodwill, 
and multiplex ties among suppliers amplify it. Finally, I discuss the implication of these case studies, 
namely that this research may guide the analysis of how embeddedness and the development of 
relational trust in goodwill may be managed in social networks.
2. Relational Trust and Social Networks 
2.1 Interorganizational Trust and Social Embeddedness 
Interfirm cooperation isoften threatened by conflicts and disintegrates a a result of them. If partner 
organizations want to continue their cooperation and invest relation-specific assets in it, they may 
face far greater isk because dissolution would render these assets worthless. Trust between 
organizations may help cooperation because it stabilizes cooperation and makes these assets afer 
(Child & Falkner, 1998: ch.2). Moreover, it also enhances cooperation because it may facilitate 
interorganizational learning between partners. It has therefore become an important issue in 
cooperation management and strategy (Rosseau et al., 1998). In particular, mutual trust beyond 
contracts and toward future goodwill is considered as a driving factor of co-evolution i  strategic 
alliances (Ring, 1997). 
       Many researchers argue for interorganizational trust as a key condition or facilitator of 
collaboration between organizations. Trust is defined here as an "expectation held by one trading 
partner about another, in which the other behaves or responds in a predictable and mutually 
acceptable manner", according to Sako (1992: 37). Interorganizational trust means that organizations 
in cooperation share such mutual expectations. Although the development of interpersonal trust 
drives the development of interorganizational trust, interorganizational trust has a collective nature 
that necessitates major members' sharing and legitimizing of trust in organizations (Zaheer et al., 
1998: 143). If major members of all organizations share mutual expectations and willingness 
concerning the cooperation, then interorganizational trust develops. One important function of 
interorganizational trust is to restrict opportunistic behaviors and to socially reduce transaction cost 
(Uzzi, 1997). 
       Social exchanges and communication affect the development of mutual commitment and 
trust. In particular, many researchers in economics, organizational studies and regional studies have. 
given substantial attention to reciprocity and reputation as two major sources of organizational 
trustworthiness that are derived from social networks (De Laat1997: 161-169; Ring, 1997: 127-129). 
First, strong reciprocal ties between organizations increase the trustworthiness of goodwill towards 
future commitments because these ties are likely to develop specific mutual commitments and 
strengthen psychological bonding. Second, reputation i creases the trustworthiness of outcomes, or 
organizational comptence . and performance. In fact, in regional industries, for example, 
organizations with good reputations enjoy far more transaction offers than those with poor reputations 
(Lane, 1998). 
      Reciprocity and reputation help trust building that is mainly based on interactions in social 
networks. Interorganizational trust is socially constituted because trust relations are actually shaped 
by social interactions, cultural integration between people with different backgrounds, and the support 
of institutional norms and sanctions (Child & Faulkner, 1998, 51-52). Lane (1998) argues that there 
are two main ways of developing trust: institution-based trust and interaction-based trust. The 
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former means that institutions provide trustworthiness, while the latter efers to trustworthiness that 
develops through social interaction. The discussion of trust building through reciprocity and 
reputation is primarily concerned with the interaction-based construction. 
      However, as Ring (1997) argues, reciprocity and reputation develop different notions of 
mutual trust: (1) the predictability of future goodwill to contribute and (2) the predictability of future 
outcomes based on competence and performance. On the one hand, reciprocity from strong social 
ties increases the predictability of goodwill. On the other hand, reputation enhances the 
predictability of outcomes that depend upon competence and competence. In keeping with the 
suggestion f Yamagishi & Yamagishi. (1994), I distinguish between trustworthiness of intention and 
competence. Since, as Blau (1964) argues, reciprocal ties tend to develop unspecified obligation a d 
broad commitment in the future, they increase the trustworthiness of intentions for future 
commitment, that is, goodwill. Following Sako (1992), I call this type of trust "relational trust in 
goodwill." On the other hand, based on reputation, organizations can be confident about the high 
trustworthiness of outcomes from partner's competence and performance.. I call this trust "general 
trust in competence." 
      As seen in the arguments of Sako (1992) and Ring (1997), prior discussions of the 
interaction-based evolution of goodwill trust mainly focus on the dyad or triad dimensions of
interactions, and only partially consider the structural effects of such interactions. These arguments 
mainly concentrate on the mechanism whereby special types of interactions i  dyads build goodwill 
trust relationships based on the logic of accumulation. But different s ructures of interactions bring 
about different results. For example, reputation is well distributed in dense networks, but not in 
sparse networks. The embeddedness approach provides us with the new insight hat the 
consequence of interaction depends on a particular relational tendency and structural property of 
social networks. With regard to trust, the embeddedness approach examines how properties of
networks - such as the role of repeated ties and the content and structure of ties - structurally affect 
the socio-cognition of trustworthiness (Dacin et al., 1999: 326). Along these lines, my analysis also 
focuses on a process of these effects and it can identify how social networks relationally and 
structurally affect he development of rustworthiness about ability and goodwill. Different social 
networks may socially constitute different type of trust. The idea of embeddedness expresses "the 
fact that economic action and outcomes, like all social action and outcomes, are affected by actors' 
dyadic (pair wise) relations and by the structure of the overall network relations" (Granoveter, 
1992:33). That is, embeddedness means the "contextualization of economic activity in on-going 
patterns ofsocial relations." (Dacin et al., 1999: 319) Thus the embeddedness approach focuses on 
the fact that (1) whole tendencies of tie quality and (2) structural forms of social networks affect the 
economic performance of organizations because they impact access to business opportunities and 
resources (Uzzi, 1996).. In organizational studies, many researchers, including those subscribing to 
sociological new institutionalism, regard embeddedness as an important factor in social context 
effects. The embeddedness approach underlines the fact that even economic organizations are 
influenced by the concrete shapes of social networks that convey information a d resource flow. I 
therefore base my analysis on the embeddedness approach. 
       To be sure, there are many ideas about he development of rust that can be found in 
economics and organizational theories. However, the embeddedness approach is the only one that 
considers the effects of reciprocity and reputation from relational nd structural viewpoints. In order 
to show what the embeddedness approach highlights, I will contrast i with three other major 
approaches: transaction cost economics, social system theory and social exchange theory. First, in 
economics, transaction cost economics (TCE) builds a fine model of how firms trust each other-as a 
collaboration problem based on game theory (Milgram & Roberts, 1992). TCE pays a great deal of 
attention to the process wherein firms cooperate when their cooperative games reach the Nash 
equilibrium. However, it tends to ignore communication and social exchanges about knowledge, 
value and norms (Child & Faulkner, 1998: 22, 31). Second, turning to sociology, social exchange 
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theory (SET) attempts to explain how social exchanges build trust relationships, expanding the 
analysis unit from dyads to networks (Emerson, 1976). However, SET tends to use economic 
models uch as the equilibrium odel and gives less consideration to the role of social context than 
does the embeddedness approach. Third, social system theory (SST) tends to focus on system or 
institutional effects on the social cognition of trust, such as the "institutional trust" of Luhman (1968). 
However, SST largely concerns itself with system effects and ignores pecific social effects that result 
from social networks and contexts. 
      Although these three earlier approaches in other fields mainly focus on the micro or macro 
level and overlook the structural effects of interactions on trust building, the embeddedness approach 
provides us with two insights on this process. First, it examines how social networks facilitate the 
sharing of information, values and norms while considering the content of ties and the structure of 
flows in a similar fashion as the sociological new institutionalism. Second, it further considers how 
social interactions in the form of reciprocal exchanges and reputation distribution structurally shape 
socio-cognitive conditions for trust as a whole. 
2.2 Development of Relational Trust and the Effects of Social Networks 
There are differences between the effects of reciprocity and the effects of reputation on 
trustworthiness. According to the embeddedness approach, they basically affect trust-building in 
two different dimensions. While the distribution of reputation in social networks differs from 
structure to structure, reciprocity makes a strong linkage in a particular relation. 
       Two dimensions of networks can- be identified as relational and structural, and as Uzzi 
(1997) stresses, the embeddedness approach focuses .a great deal of attention on the "quality" and 
"structure" of ties. Granovetter (1985) expressed these as the analytical concepts of relational and 
structural embeddedness. First, relational embeddedness is the dimensional extent of the quality of 
ties. Relational embeddedness that concretely includes the strength or content of ties indicates how 
actors connect in dyads or triads and how much these ties affect economic performance.' In this 
regard, strength, content of ties and cohesion are mainly studied in order to seek strong ties or 
reciprocal linkages. The strength of ties shows how two actors trongly link. Cohesive subgroups 
are likely to develop a high degree of specific homogeneity, because cohesive subgroups refer 
to "subsets of actors among whom there are relatively strong, direct, intense or positive ties" and 
which tend to have high mutuality and reciprocity of ties (Wasserman & Faust, 1994: 249-252). 
       Second, structural embeddedness i  an analytical concept hat applies to the structural 
dimensions of networks. It is primarily used to examine how the structure of ties organizes flows of 
resource or information among organizations and affects economic performance (Uzzi, 1996). The 
positions of actors in the structure are also important units of analysis, because a position refers to a 
role in the distribution and mobilization of information and resources in a social network. In the 
analysis of structural embeddedness, density of structure, bridges and block modeling are generally 
explored. Density tells us how thick ties are connected in a network. In network analysis, bridges 
are regarded as playing the important role of gatekeeper (in studies of innovation for example (Burt, 
2001)) and finding them involves looking for broker ties between separate subnetworks. Block 
modeling involves sorting out actors with similar positioning in a network structure and identifying 
similar roles in access or distribution within that network, so it is typically used to analyze roles in a 
network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994: ch. 10). 
       However, based on the perspectives of these two types of embeddedness, reciprocity and 
reputation are considered to develop different ypes of trust in different embeddedness dimensions 
(Rowley et al., 2000: 372). 
       First, in the relational dimension, reciprocity that implies strong social ties between 
particular actors in dyads or triads is likely to facilitate relational trust in goodwill (Rowley et al.,
1 Uzzi (1996) suggests that since the overall tendencies of relational embeddedness may affect the overall flow 
of information and resources in social networks, they can be regarded as parts of the total structure's properties. 
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2000:372). As Blau (1964) argues, when actors reciprocally continue social exchanges they tend to 
create unspecified obligations and share relatively unlimited and particular mutual commitments. 
They are very likely to .recognize the goodwill of others to commit o their current reciprocal relations 
in the future as well. Thus, reciprocal or strong social ties are likely to develop relational trust in 
goodwill. 
       Second, in the structural dimension, a network structure with high density or the existence 
of many intermediaries which may link many actors and frequently distribute reputation among them 
is very likely to facilitate the development of general trust in competences and performances (Rowley 
et al., 2000: 372). As Coleman (1990: 186-188) argues, dense and multiple-linked networks can 
frequently mediate the reputation of some actor among many other actors and help them to be 
constantly well informed about hat actor's actual state of ability and performance. This facilitates 
trust in the ability and performance of that actor. Since a great deal of reputation enhances the 
predictability of outcomes among actors, they can accurately calculate the ability levels and 
performance of reputed actors. Rowley et al. (2000: 372) argue that a social network with high 
density or many intermediaries allows actors to enjoy lots of information about reputation so that it 
functions as a monitoring and sanctioning device. 
      One can summarize the foregoing arguments about rustworthiness and embeddedness in the 
two hypotheses below:
Hypothesis 1: An abundance of reciprocal ties among organizations 
relational trust in goodwill by enhancing the predictability of goodwill.
facilitates the development of
Hypothesis 2: Such structural properties as high density or many intermediaries are 
the development of general trust in ability and performance by enhancing the 
outcomes through an abundance of reputation.
likely to facilitate 
predictability of
      It is worth mentioning that reciprocity sometimes affects and is affected by a reputation 
effect. On the one hand, reciprocity may amplify reputation with closure. Strong ties amplify the 
valuation of reputation i a social network if it is relatively closed (Burt, 2001). On the other hand, 
if, with multiplex channels of reputation, an organization gets a great deal of positive reputation from 
many channels about maintaining goodwill, then that organization sees much more trustworthiness in 
their partner's ability to maintain goodwill. Thus it is likely to positively enhance reciprocity. Burt 
(2001) called this "the bandwidth effect." 
2.3 Relational Trust and Japanese Buyer-Supplier Relations 
Japanese buyer-supplier relations, especially in vertical keiretsu, provide a typical example of 
interactions in which social networks develop a long-term and deep mutual commitment that is 
relational trust in goodwill.2 Managers of buyer and supplier companies have frequent 
communication and contacts concerning research & development, joint production, quality control 
and so on. Based on her comparative studies, Sako (1992) argues that with such strong social ties, 
most Japanese buyer-supplier relations have much more particular and unlimited commitment than 
British contractual relations, and they have a "goodwill trust" relationship. However, few have 
explored how Japanese companies develop such mutual commitments through social networking. 
On the contrary, some large Japanese firms have regarded such deep and stable commitments with 
suppliers as obstacles to radical innovation and started to break them in the 1990s. Such firms 
appear to face overembeddedness problems. However, they still manage their social networks to 
restructure buyer-supplier relations. Therefore, the analysis of Japanese social network management
2 There are two kinds of keirets
u: horizontal and vertical. Here I mainly discuss the vertical type, such as the 
Toyota group or the NEC group that consist of a core manufacturing company and its numerous subcontractors, 
subsidiaries and affiliates for joint production (Hsu, 1994: 199-200) 
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in long-term buyer-supplier relations till reveals clues about he management of embeddedness. 
       In the automobile and consumer-electronic i dustries, Japanese buyer-supplier relations are 
typically characterized bydeep mutual commitment. In comparison toarm's length relations (ALR) 
wherein buyers and suppliers in a market, and tend to take opportunities, Sako (1992) expressed such 
a mutual committed relationship like the Japanese buyer-supplier relations as obligation contractual 
relations (OCR) wherein buyers and suppliers hare an obligation to cooperate for common future 
over the written contract. She points out that OCR is supported by goodwill trust, while cooperation 
on ALR is based on competence or contractual trust. This comparison i dicates differences in the 
width and depth of mutual commitment in each relationship. Goodwill trust is the relation that 
includes mutual expectations of a willingness to contribute more than the contract demands, while 
contractual trust mainly implies mutual expectations of contractual compliance. 
       Goodwill trust is developed through special properties in the social networks of managers 
that span buyers and suppliers. Sako (1992, 129) argues that frequent mutual contacts and multiplex 
linkages between boundary spanning managers across organizations deepen mutual commitments and 
interorganizational learning. In particular, the supplier association is a key institutional setting for 
such development. A supplier association (kyoryoku-kai) is a firm group in which a major buyer 
firm organizes main supplier firms for the improvement of productivity, technology, quality and 
management. This association has two main functions. First, thereby creating strong ties with 
suppliers, a large buyer encourages them to share information about their technology, production 
plans, management know-how and quality control methods. Second, the association also encourages 
suppliers to learn the best practices from not only the buyer but also from other suppliers in order to 
improve their technology and management. In the discussion of supplier associations, many 
researchers a sume that suppliers also share many horizontal, strong, reciprocal and multiplex ties and 
thus uniformly share homogeneous information with each other (Sako, 1992; Cusmano & Takeishi, 
1991). However many researchers mainly concentrate upon the analysis of dyads between buyers and 
suppliers and only partially examine horizontal ties among suppliers. 
       In particular, collaboration and learning about quality control and improvement between a
buyer and supplier organization constitute a typical case of this networking and trust building. 
Supplier quality control (SQC) means the special quality control management i  which a buyer 
encourages suppliers to collaborate in order to economically and effectively produce goods of the 
quality which a buyer equires (Sasaki eds. 1991 2e: 9). In supplier quality control, it is essential that 
a buyer company receives continuous contributions from their major suppliers and encourages them 
to engage in continuous organizational learning for quality control and improvement. Thus, as 
Parker & Edwards (2002) suggest, it is very important for a buyer to build a mutual trust in quality 
management with their major suppliers. Goodwill trust is an especially effective relational condition 
for this (Sako, 1992). A supplier association often facilitates its development with dense networking 
among quality control managers ofbuyer and suppliers. 
       However, because they largely fail to use the embeddedness perspective to examine the 
qualities and structure of networks in Japanese buyer-supplier relations, the main conventional 
arguments about hese relations uffer from two basic problems. First, they tend to focus on dyad 
exchanges between a buyer and suppliers and fail to examine the shaping effects of social networks 
among them, so they miss structural effects of ties. Second, they tend to regard all buyer-supplier 
relations as relatively uniform, so they ignore differences in the content of ties and their effects 
among subgroups or subnetworks. We therefore need to pay much more attention to the effects that 
the quality and structure of ties have on the development of trust. 
       From the embeddedness approach, the network chrematistics of Japanese buyer-supplier 
relations can be considered in two ways. First, in terms of relational embeddedness, reciprocal ties 
among buyer and supplier organizations facilitate the development of relational trust in goodwill. 
Second, the multiplex tie structure between a buyer and its suppliers further amplifies this trust, 
because reputation from many channels reinforces the reputation of maintaining oodwill. I will 
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examine these points with a network analysis of social networks in two supplier associations of two 
Japanese electronic companies in Japan. In doing so, I will also examine how a buyer company 
shapes social networks in its supplier associations in order to manage embeddedness and trust.
3. The Empirical Research concerning Social. Embeddedness and Trustworthiness in 
Supplier Associations 
3.1 Social Networks in Supplier Associations. 
I have empirically conducted primarily survey, and additionally interview, research about social 
networks in two supplier associations of Japanese lectronics manufacturers in order to examine how 
social networks affect suppliers' cognition of trustworthiness about buyers' goodwill. I have focused 
on the investigation ofhow relational and structural embeddedness affects the cognition of relational 
trust in goodwill. 
      I investigated two supplier associations of two electronic manufacturers: Tohoku Ricoh Co. 
ltd. (Tohoku Ricoh), the subsidiary production company of Ricoh Co. ltd., and Tohoku Pioneer 
Corporation (Tohoku Pioneer), the subsidiary production company of Pioneer Corporation (See Tab. 
1). 
       These two companies have their own supplier associations. Tohoku Ricoh's supplier 
association has 30 supplier firms, while Tohoku Pioneer's has 48 suppliers. Many suppliers in both 
associations are small-medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in electronic and machinery manufacturing 
that are located near buyer companies and have histories of continuous transactions that are more than 
twenty ears long (See table 2). However, they do not depend on one buyer and instead trade with 
more than 150 companies. Most of them are not done capital participation ot do receive any 
managers from buyers. Both buyers organized supplier associations in order to encourage their main 
suppliers to share information about their production plans, quality control methods and basic 
production technology with not only buyers but also other suppliers. 
3.2 Data and method 
I gathered ata about supplier quality control (SQC) related manager contact networks comprised of 
buyers and suppliers in both supplier associations, and examined this data to see if such networks 
affected suppliers' cognition of buyers' trustworthiness. These SQC-related managers include 
managers of quality control and purchasing inthe buyer firm, and managers of quality assurance and 
sales and sometimes even general managers in supplier firms. In both associations, SQC-related 
engineers and managers of buyers and suppliers frequently exchange information about basic 
production technology and quality control. In other words, they have contact networks. I 
examined these interorganizational ties primarily through the use of mailed surveys sent to all 
suppliers in both supplier associations concerning contact ties, the trustworthiness of buyer firms and 
their QC performance. I also interviewed SQC-related managers of two buyer companies and four 
main suppliers during 2000 to 2001.3 From these ties, I have constructed two social networks of two 
supplier associations. 
       Using the survey data, I first used the network analysis method to analyze the tie strength 
and structural form of SQC-related managers' ocial networks among buyers and suppliers. In the 
questionnaire survey, I asked for information on five points: (1) years and share of transactions 
between buyers and suppliers, (2) organization and activities concerning quality control, (3) contacts 
per year among buyers and suppliers, (4) buyer's trustworthiness in goodwill and competence, and (5) 
suppliers' performance of quality control. Following this analysis, I then added interview data and 
focused on examining how relational and structural properties of networks affect rustworthiness and 
the performance ofquality control.
3 The return rate of questionnaire is 88.5 % (69 returns from 78 suppliers).
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Table 1. Profiles of Tohoku Ricoh and Tohoku Pioneer (2002)








Established year 1967 1966
Capital 18.95 Million USD 90.07 Million USD
Sales 619.68 Million USD 459.43 Million USD
Employees 1404 1289
Parent Company Ricoh Co. ltd. Pioneer Corporation
Location Yamagata Pref, Japan Miyagi Pref. Japan
Suppliers 396 suppliers 117 suppliers
Supplier Association (SA) Have Have
No. of Suppliers in SA, 30 suppliers 48 suppliers
*Exchange Rate 1 USD = 119.90 JPY (Dec, 2002)
Table 2. Average Profiles of Suppliers in Supplier Associations
Items Average
Employees 175.04 people
Capital 58.89 Thousands USD
Operation Years 38.46 years
Location 63.8% are in 3 pref. near buyers
Products 23.9%: MachininG-Mnd Metal Processing
2.9 %: Electronic devices
No. of Customers 153.75 companies
Share of Tohoku Ricoh or Pioneer in Whole Sales 75.1 % of suppliers have share under 50%
Years of Transaction with both buyers 24.26 years
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(a) Independent Variables 
As unidirectional ties between organizations, I asked about and counted communication contacts of 
SQC-related managers-not nly between a buyer and supplier but also among suppliers in both 
supplier associations (See fig 1). These contacts concern the exchange of information and advice 
that is mainly related to quality management. With these ties, I constructed two social networks 
between abuyer and its suppliers in two supplier associations. These networks do not overlap. 
      The independent variables are variables of embeddedness. Using several methods of social 
network analysis, I identified and compared groups of supplier organizations with high and low 
embeddedness. In the relational one, I used strength of ties and social cohesion. On the other hand, 
for the structural one, I identified structurally equivalent groups with the block model analysis, and 
calculated the information centrality of each supplier as an indicator of positioning in information 
flows. 
(b) Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables are four aspects of buyer trustworthiness in the senses of goodwill and 
competence (Appendix A). In terms of relational trustworthiness of goodwill, I asked suppliers if 
they expect a buyer to have goodwill towards continuous collaboration with suppliers (G-1) and 
long-term support for them (G-2). I averaged the sum of both to the "average index of 
trustworthiness of goodwill (G-M)." In terms of general trustworthiness of competences, I asked 
suppliers how they evaluate a buyer's level of quality control capability (A-1) and the effects of 
advice received from that buyer (A-2). I also averaged the sum of both to the "average index of 
trustworthiness of competence (A-M)." In each aspect, I measured four grades of trustworthiness.4 
      I also asked suppliers about their performance of quality improvement as an independent 
variable. I asked them if the ratio of rejected goods over the past hree years has increased or
.decreased (P-1), and I also inquired about the number ofclaims in-the past hree months (P-2). 
3.3 Results 
(a) Tie Quality and Network Structure 
First of all, I examined the properties of social networks' embeddedness in both supplier associations, 
jointly analyzing the data of contact ties of SQC-related managers in both supplier associations. I 
identified similar embeddedness in both supplier associations, regarding torelational nd structural 
dimensions 
       In terms of relational embeddedness, buyers and suppliers on average have strong ties with 
great variances in the strength indicator (contact frequency), and form cohesive subgroups. In terms 
of tie strength, SQC-related managers f om a buyer and its suppliers make contact on average 11.50 
times per a year. Among suppliers, SQC managers (mainly general managers charged with QC) 
make contact an average of 7.81 times per a year. Taking ties between a buyer and suppliers and 
dividing supplier organizations by the median number of contacts (20 times per year), 5 I 
distinguished two groups as a "strong tie subgroup" and "weak tie subgroup." In terms of social 
cohesion, I also identified cohesive subgroups bya clique finding method: following standards from 
Barnes (1969: 64), I chose a set of cliques more than five nodes in number and 0.7 in density. I
distinguish "cohesive subgroups" asvery reciprocal subgroups. Suppliers in cohesive subgroups 
have more frequent contacts (an average of29.13 times) with a buyer than the other suppliers (8.90 
times), and this gap is statistically significant. A characteristic of suppliers incohesive subgroup is 
to have far fewer customers (an average of 11.63 customers) than the other suppliers (173.70 
customers on average). For cohesive subgroups, transactions with Tohoku Ricoh or Pioneer are 
more valuable than those with others. Furthermore, from interviews with suppliers and buyers, 
buyers are willing to give far more advice, resources and help to core suppliers, because these
4 I gave four grades from "we feel it very much (4 points: max)", to "we feel it (3)," "we don't feel 
it much (2)," and "we never feel it (1)." 
5 Because the variance ofcontacts is very large, dividing by average value is meaningless.
9
Relational Trust and Embeddedness in Interorganizational Networks 
Naoki Wakabayashi
suppliers are charged with the core production of parts and the subconstruction of the core assembly 
process. Thus buyers heavily depend upon them.
Fig. I SQC Manager Networks in Two Supplier Associations 
(a) Communication Networks in Tohoku Ricoh's Supplier Association
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Fig. 2 Multiplex Tie and Dyad Tie Subgroup 















Mult iplex Tie Subgroup 
 Buyer Company (Tohoku Ricoh or Tohoku Pioneer)
Tie Subgroup
(iII) : Suppliers
       Next, in terms of structural embeddedness, I sought out multiplex tie subgroups and 
suppliers with advantageous positions in information flow. First, in examining the structural 
equivalence of linkages using the block model analysis (Wasserman & Faust, 1994: ch. 10), I was able 
to extract wo subgroups -- a "multiplex tie subgroup" and a "dyad tie subgroup" -- that exist only 
between abuyer and a supplier (See fig. I & 2). The former has multiplex linkages between abuyer 
and suppliers, including horizontal ties between suppliers in particular. The latter has only dyad ties 
between a buyer and a supplier and no horizontal ties between suppliers. A characteristic of
suppliers in multiplex tie subgroups i to have far fewer customers (an average of 28.40 customers) 
than the other suppliers (176.55 customers, on average). Multiplex tie groups have slightly stronger 
transactions. Suppliers in them locate in the same prefecture as or ones adjacent to the buyer's, and 
much closer to a buyer than other suppliers. Second, as I calculated the information centrality index 
to be an average of 0.4074 (variance = .0008), I had more than ten suppliers with positioning in 
information flows from more than two organizations. 
(b) Network Effects on Buyer's Trustworthiness 
I modeled the hypothesis that relationally embedded (i.e. strong and cohesive) ties are likely to let 
suppliers with such ties perceive a higher relational trustworthiness of goodwill than those without 
them. 
      The average recognition of trustworthiness in every aspect is high (See fig.3). However, a
higher level of relational embeddedness is likely to increase the cognitive level of the trustworthiness 
of a buyer's goodwill (See Tab.3). Strong tie groups ee higher elational trustworthiness in a buyer 
than those with weak ties, in terms of the average trustworthiness of goodwill. Suppliers in cohesive 
subgroups tend to see a buyer's goodwill towards continuous collaboration as being more trustworthy 
than do other suppliers. Although differences in scores are not very large in all the indexes of 
goodwill trust, I can nevertheless confirm the positive effects of relational embeddedness onthe 
cognition of goodwill trustworthiness.
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Fig. 3 Average Scores of Buyers' Trustworthiness 
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                         0.00 1.00 2.00
Max=4) 
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* 1: Range of Score is from 1 (Min) to 4 (Max). 
*2: (**): p-value < 0.05; (***): p-value <0.01. 
*3: (G-M) is average score of trustworthiness of goodwill.: average of sum of (G-1) and (G-2). 
   score of trustworthiness of competence: average of sum of (A-1) and (A-2).
(A-M) is also average
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(G-1) Goodwill in Continuous Collaboration 
(G-2) Goodwill in Long-term Supports 




*: (**): p-value < 0.05; (***): p-value <0.01.
Table 5. Relational Embeddedness and QC Performance
(1) Stren th of Ties and No. of Claims in Recent 3 Months
Strength of Ties / No. 






Less than 2 times 
More than 3 times 










*: Chi Square =8.333 (p-value < 0.01)
(2) Cohesive Subgroups and No. of Claims in Recent 3 Months
Cohesive Subgroups / 
   No. of Claims
Cohesive 
Subgroups
Rest of All Sum
Less than 2 times 
More than 3 times 










*: Chi Square =3.133 (p-value < 0.1)
       Next we move to an examination of structural embeddedness. With structural equivalence 
analysis, if suppliers are positioned in multiplex ties between abuyer and suppliers, they tend to view 
more trustworthiness in goodwill than suppliers that are only in a dyad with a buyer. In addition, 
multiplex tie subgroups in the two networks mostly overlap with cohesive subgroups; however, they 
show high levels in both goodwill scores. This shows that multiplex ties apparently enhance the 
trustworthiness of goodwill. Next, in terms of an actor's power to control information flow, 
Information Centrality (IC) expresses the value of a position in a network. The information centrality 
index 6 focuses on "information contained in all the paths originating with a specific actor 
"(Wasserman & Faust
, 1994: 194). The information centrality of suppliers and the trustworthiness 
of goodwill positively and statistically significantly correlate by the Spearman correlation i dex (See 
Table 4). This shows that suppliers that are in the central positions of information flows are likely to 
view a buyer's goodwill as trustworthy.
6 The information centrality index CI(n) (an actor n) can be calculated using the following formula 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994: 194-196): CI(n)=1/(cll+(T 2R)/g) where Tis the sum of the diagonal entries 
of the matrix and R is any one of the row sum. cl, is the element ofthe inverse matrix of the graph matrix N. 
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(c) Network Effects on SQC Performance 
In terms of a decrease in rejected products and claims, I tried to examine network effects on quality 
management performance. However, I discovered few effects (See Tab. 5). High levels of 
relational embeddedness variables affect only the number of claims in the most recent hree months. 
Buyers find it easier to make claims against suppliers with strong ties than those with weak ties, and 
cohesive subgroups tend to have slightly more than the rest of the suppliers. Thus, suppliers that 
have more relationally embedded ties with a buyer are likely to get more claims about quality 
problems, probably because of the frequent communication between them.
4. Discussion 
This research suggests that 1) a high level of relational embeddedness promotes a positive evaluation 
of the trustworthiness of a buyer's goodwill through reciprocity, and 2) the special properties of 
structural embeddedness amplify this. These implications suggest that, even in core supplier groups, 
the level of trust building between buyers and suppliers depends on differences in tie quality and the 
structural form of interorganizational etworks. Thus, the mechanism of embedding and trust 
building requires further clarification. 
       As I discuss above, the level of embeddedness affects trust building in two ways. First, in 
the dyad relational dimension, reciprocal exchanges enhance the predictability of goodwill because 
they make unspecified obligations and increase mutual expectations of future commitments. Second, 
in the structural dimension of social networks, if organizations can enjoy multi-channeled distribution 
of reputation through densely connected linkages or intermediaries, it such organizations feel a high 
level of predictability about he ability and performance of their partners. My empirical examination 
of two social networks of QC-related managers in two supplier associations certainly acknowledges 
these mbeddedness ffects. In terms of relational embeddedness, strong tie subgroups and cohesive 
subgroups tend to see more trustworthiness in a buyer's goodwill towards continuous collaboration 
and long-term support . Positioning in multiplex ties also amplifies the trustworthiness of goodwill 
because the frequent and wide distribution of a buyer's reputation for maintaining oodwill makes 
suppliers in such positions easily reassured about he buyer's goodwill. 
      Although structural viewpoints uggest hat mutuality in tie quality and multiplex in 
structural properties in social networks can facilitate relational trust in goodwill in Japanese 
buyer-supplier relations, conventional discussions of manager networks in these relations tend to 
neglect structural perspectives. Structural viewpoints also clarify the fact that supplier associations 
are effective institutional settings for building trust in goodwill. Conventional discussions also tend 
to regard all interorganizational etwork ties as homogeneous, meaning strong and equally dense. 
But from the structural viewpoint of the embeddedness approach, tie quality, network structure and 
levels of trustworthiness differ from area to area in networks. Characteristics of embeddedness in 
each subnetwork affect the positive recognition of trustworthiness in goodwill. Moreover, 
positioning in multiplex ties amplifies this trustworthiness, although complex effects between 
relational and structural embeddedness remain unclear and require further investigation. 
       My research suggests that networking may be used to actively manage mbeddedness and 
trustworthiness. In the interview data, a buyer intentionally builds networking with core suppliers in 
order to give a great deal of information, technological dvice and human- and machinery resources. 
Since, as Dacin et al. (1999) argue, the management of embeddedness is till a green field of research, 
however, there may be several other ways to accomplish the same ends, by investing in relationships 
for example. The embeddedness approach can suggest how to manage embeddedness and 
trustworthiness bybuilding special networks. 
       The recent phenomenon of keiretsu disorganization -- as seen in the reform of Nissan's 
keiretsu supplier networks by Carlos Ghon, the Nissan CEO from Renault -- seems to break trust 
between a buyer and its suppliers. However, based on the embeddedness approach, we can still 
recognize these structural reforms as a way of managing embeddedness and trustworthiness.
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Because overembeddedness makes networks inflexible and less innovative (Uzzi, 1996), it seems to 
bring about he disorganization f keiretsu networks. However, the embeddedness approach shows 
us that the organization and restructuring of current Japanese buyer-supplier relations is actually 
located on the same continuum as the management of embeddedness in interorganizational etworks. 
Nevertheless, we need more empirical research concerning the management of embeddedness and 
trustworthiness through interorganizational networking in order to understand how the 
interorganizational le rning mode changes.
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Appendix A. Questions about Networks and Trustworthiness
I used the following questions as measurements.
(1) Measurement of Trustworthiness (4 grade evaluation) 
   (G-1) Our collaborative r lation with the buyer (Tohoku Ricoh or Pioneer) will continue for a long time. 
   (G-2) We think that the buyer's upport for our QC includes long-term support for our growth. 
  (A-1) We think the QC capability of the buyer is very high. 
   (A-2) We think that the buyer's advice regarding our QC management is very helpful. 
(2) Contacts with a Buyer 
  How many times in a year do you make contact with each of following managers ofthe buyer? 
  (a) Quality control or assurance managers (b) Purchasing managers 
(3) Contacts with Other Suppliers 
   Have you contacted any manager of any other supplier in your supplier association? 
  (a) What supplier (b) With which manager of this supplier (c) How many times in a year 
(4) Performance ofQuality Management 
   (a) Your company's ratio of rejected goods has decreased inthe past three years of production for the buyer. 
   (b) How many claims have you received from the buyer in the past hree months?
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